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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
vs. 
Plaintiff and 
Responoent, 
BRIEF 
Case No. 19184 
H~ATHER S. AMICONE, 
Defendant and 
Appellant. 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This case involves a challenge to the constitutionality of 
the mandatory seven day sentencing provision of the State's 
obscenity statute, Section 76-10-1204 Utah Code Annotated 1953, 
as amended. 
DISPOSITION IN THF LOWER COURT 
The appellant-Amicone pleaded guilty in Fifth Circuit Court 
to a charge of knowingly distributing obscene material in 
violation of the State's pornography statute, Section 76-10-1204, 
Utah Code Ann., 1953, as amended. 
After pleading quilty, the Appellant-Amicone appealed her 
rnnviction to the District Court. The Honorable Homer F. 
Wilkinson affi~ed Appellant-Amicone's plea of guilty to 
~nowlingly di~tributing pornographic material, and the seven day 
jail sentence imposed by the Circuit rourt. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The Plaintiff-Respondent, State of Utah, seeks to have this 
Court uphold the constitutionality of the sentencing provisions 
of the State's obscenity statute and affirm the sentence of the 
Appellant-Amicone. 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
The State of Utah, by and through the State's Attorney 
General, has requested the assistance of Salt Lake City in 
response to this appeal by A?pellant. (See letter of the 
Attorney General attached as Appendix "A"). 
The thrust of appellant's argument on appeal is that the 
minimum seven day mandatory jail sentence required for those who 
knowingly distribute obscene material is unconstitutional. The 
statute provides: 
"Fach separate offense under this section is a 
class A misdemeanor punishable by a minimum 
mandatory fine of not less than $100 plus $10 for 
each article exhibited up to the maximum allowed 
by law and by incarceration, without suspension of 
sentence in any way, for a term of not less than 
seven days, notwithstanding any provisions of 
section 77-35-17." Section 76-10-1204(2) Utah 
Code Ann. 
Appellant-Amicone alleges that this statute constitutes a 
violation of the doctrine of separation of powers, cruel and 
unusual punishment, am1 a violation of the First Amendment. 
However, appellant cites no viable authority in support of her 
constitutional challenges. The state will respond to each of 
-2-
--,1 issues infra. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The facts of this case demonstrate the following: 
1. On March 4, 1982, a Search Warrant for the film "Ms. 
Magnificence" was issued by the Honorable Robert C. Gibson, Judge 
of the Fifth Circuit Court. 
2. The film "Ms. Magnificence" described in the Affidavit 
for Search Warrant was seized on March 4, 1982. 
3. A Class A misdemeanor Information was filed againt 
Appellant-Amicone, in Circuit Court Salt Lake Department, Case 
No. 82 CRS 645, for knowingly distributing pornographic material, 
in violation of Section 76-10-1204, Utah Code Ann. 1953. (R-20). 
4. On July 6, 1982, the appellant entered an informed and 
voluntary plea of guilty to the charge of knowingly distributing 
an obscene motion picture in violation of Section 76-10-1204 
U.C.A. (R-3, 6-7). 
5. Prior to appellant's plea of guilty, the full 
ramifications of the plea were explained, together with all 
possible penalties and the minimum mandatory fine and jail 
sentence. This voluntary plea of guilty complied with the 
reouirements of Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969). (R-6, 
7). 
6. The appellant arqued, in connection with sentencing 
which occurred on August 30, 1982, that the minimum mandatory 
1ail sentence required by 76-10-1204(2) was unconstitutional. 
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This argument was rejected by the Court ancl a fine of $lll00 wi1s 
imposed, together with one year in the County jail. The Court 
suspended all but seven days of the jail sentence. (R-3, 5-7). 
7. On appeal to the Third District Court, Appellant-
Amicone's argument was rejected in an opinion by the Honorable 
Homer F. Wilkinson. The Court held that the sentencing statute 
is "a vali0 leqislative enactment, that it is not an intrusion 
into the judicial function by the Legislature nor is it a 
violation of the separation of powers doctrine." (R-60-62). 
Attached as Appendix "B". 
8. Appellant then instituted this appeal before the Court. 
ARGUMENT 
SECTION 76-10-1204(2), UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 
WHICH REOUIRES A MINIMUM MANDATORY JAIL 
SENTENCE FOR KNOWINGLY DISTRIBUTING OBSCENE 
MATERIAL IS CONSTITUTIONAL AND DOES NOT 
ABRIDGE ANY RIGHTS GRANTED BY THE 
CONSTITUTION OF EITHER THE UNITED STATES OR 
THE STATE OF UTAH. 
A. THE MANDATORY SENTENCING REQUIREMENT OF §76-
10-1204 ( 2) DOES NOT VIOLATE THE DOCTRINE OF 
SEPARATION OF POWERS. 
The Appellant-Amicone has alleged that the statutory 
reouirement of a minimum mandatory sentence is an intrusion into 
a judicial function by the legislature, and therefore a violation 
of the separation of powers cloctrine. However, this argument has 
been almost universally rejected by the courts; this rejection is 
particularly true of matters not involving the death penalty. 
Nearly seventy years ago the U.S. Supreme Court enunciated 
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, 1,,c lonq stanninq principle in Ex Parte United States 1 that the 
"'atter of providing for crimes and their punishment is a 
Jr:qislative function. The Court cautioned against unwarranted 
junicial intrusion into the legislative area in the following 
lanquage: 
"If it be that the plain legislative command 
fixing a specific punishment for crime is subject 
to be permanently set aside by an implied judicial 
power upon considerations extraneous to the 
legality of the conviction, it would seem 
necessarily to follow that there could be likewise 
implied a discretionary authority to permanently 
refuse to try a criminal charge because of the 
conclusion that a particular act made criminal by 
law ought not to be treated as criminal. And thus 
it would come to pass that the possession by the 
judicial department of power to permanently refuse 
to enforce a law would result in the destruction 
of the conceded powers of the other departments, 
and hence leave no law to be enforced." Id. at 
42. 
This principle has been strictly adhered to for decades by 
the courts of this country. In State v. Motley, 2 the Missouri 
~ppellate Court rejected the defendant's contention that a state 
statute imposing a 10-year minimum mandatory sentence for 
narcotic sales, without the possibility of probation or a 
suspPnded sentence, usurped judicial functions in violation of 
the state's constitution. The court also rejected the contention 
!licit the court has inherent power to grant or deny probation to a 
,,, l c't fsl of fender. The court noted that fixing punishment for a 
1
2J2 U.S. 27, 37 S.Ct. 72 (1916). 
2
'.H, :c.1:.2a 435 (1976, Mo.App.). 
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crime defined by statute is the province of the lenislature, not 
the courts. 
The court concluded that there had been no usurpation of 
judicial authority and indicated that it would be a judicial 
invasion of legislative power for the courts to refuse to impose, 
at least, the minimum mandatory sentence. The court held: 
"Thus, the legislature by statutory enactment 
described crimes and prescribes punishment and for 
a court to refuse imposition of prescribed 
penalties by the device of indefinite suspension 
of sentence or similar means, would constitute 
judicial usurpation of legislative power. It is 
clear that contrary to defendant's contention---
there has been no usurpation of judicial authority 
here; indeed the opposite would occur if a court 
on conviction refused imposition or ordered 
indefinite suspension of sentence." Id. at 438. 
(Emphasis added). 
In Banks v. State, 3 the Florida Supreme Court held that a 
minimum 25 year imprisonment for sexual battery was not 
excessive, cruel, or unusual; it specifically held it did not 
usurp judicial authority. Quoting an earlier Florida case, the 
Court said: 
"'The determination of maximum and minimum 
penalties to be imposed for violation of the laws 
remains a matter for the legislature.'" Id. at 
470. (Emphasis added). 
The Supreme Court of Florida has also held a mandatory 
minimum 3-year sentence for conviction of aggravated assault, 
where a firearm is used, to be constitutional. The Court held: 
3 342 S. 2d 469 (Fla. 1977). 
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"This Court has long held, and now reaffirms its 
holding, that where a sentence is one that has 
been established by the legislature and is not on 
its face cruel and unusual, it will be sustained 
when attacked on arounds of due process, equal 
protection, or separation of power theories ••. 
we do not find the mandatory three-year sentence 
provision to be cruel or unusual." Sowell v. 
State, 342 S.2d 969 (Fla., 1977) (Emphasis added). 
In Commonwealth v. Jackson, 4 the Supreme Court of 
Massachusetts held that a mandatory minimum jail sentence of one 
year for first time offenders is not unconstitutional. The Court 
so held and rejected contentions of: cruel and unusual punish-
ment, denial of due process, equal protection and violation of 
separation of powers. 
Referring to the separation of powers argument, the Court 
observed: 
"The ability to defer the imposition of sentence, 
although a valuable feature in our legal system, 
is not necessary to the very existence of a court, 
and, as such, is not an inherent power beyond 
statutory limitation. 
"The logic of this position is demonstrated by 
considering that in our tripartite system of 
government it is unquestionable that the 
Legislature has the authority to determine what 
conduct shall be punishable and to prescribe 
penalties. Although it is the court's 
function to impose sentences upon conviction, it 
is for the Legislature to establish criminal 
sanctions and, as one of its options, it may 
prescribe a mandatory minimum term of 
imprisonment." ..!._£. at 177 (Emphasis added). 
This same Massachusetts law regarding a mandatory minimum 
4
344 N.E.2d 166 (Mass. 1976). 
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sentence was upheld as constitutional in McQuoid v. Smith. 5 
Here, in a case upholding a mandatory one year sentence for 
carrying a fire arm, the court ruled this statute did not violate 
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
The State respectfully submits that the determination of the 
type of sentence to be imposed for criminal violation is a 
legislative matter. The seven day minimum and one year maximum 
jail sentence is well within the prerogative of the legislature. 
It, thus, does not violate the doctrine of separation of powers. 
B. THE MANDATORY JAIL SENTENCE REQUIREMENT OF 
§76-10-1204(2) DOES NOT CONSTITUTE CRUEL AND 
UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT. 
Appellant alleges that the sentence imposed here is cruel 
and unusual. In so doing the appellant relies heavily upon a 
recent Supreme Court decision, Solem v. Helm6 . In Solem the 
Court held that the Eighth Amendment proscribed the imposition of 
a life sentence, under South Dakota's recidivest statute, without 
possibility of parole for a seventh non-violent felony. The 
court's holding was specifically limited to the circumstances of 
that case and did not address the "general validity of sentences 
without possibility of parole." 7 
The court in Solem held that criminal sentences must be 
5 556 F.2d 595 (1st Circuit, 1977). 
6 U.S. 77 L.Ed.2d 637 (1983). 
7 Id. footnote 24. 
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l'"i-t ionate to the criminal offense involved. However, the 
"<1r t also stressed the importance of deferring to the 
JPoislative enactment of criminal offenses and penalties. The 
court held: 
"In sum, we hold as a matter of principle that a 
criminal sentence must be proportionate to the 
crime for which the defendant has been 
convicted. Reviewing courts, of course, should 
orant substantial deference to the broad authority 
that legislatures necessarily possess in 
determining the types and limits of punishments 
for crimes, as well as to the discretion that 
trial courts possess in sentencing convicted 
criminals." Id. at 649. (Emphasis added). 
The Court specifically did not overrule its earlier 
decision, Rummel v. Estelle, 8 where a life sentence for a third 
non-violent felony was upheld; rather the Court expressly limited 
its holding in Solem to the circumstances of that case. Further, 
the Court emphasized the role of legislatures in establishing 
sentences as follows: 
"We agree, therefore, that, '[o) utside the context 
of capital punishment, successful challenges to 
the proportionality of particular sentences [will 
be] exceedingly rare,'. 
* * * 
"[W)e do not adopt or imply approval of a general 
rule of appellate review of sentences. Absent 
specific authority, it is not the role of an 
appellate court to substitute its judgment for 
!Jiat of the sentencing court as to the 
appropriateness of a particular sentence; rather, 
in applying the Eighth Amendment the appellate 
court decides only whether the sentence under 
B 4 4 c-, r_1 • S • 2 6 3 ( 1 9 8 0 ) • 
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review is within constitutional limits. In view 
of the substantial defenence that must be accorded 
legislatures and sentencing courts, a reviewing 
court rarely will be required to enqage in 
extended analysis to determine that a sentence is 
not constitutionally disproportionate." Id. at 
649, and footnote 16 (Emphasis added}. 
The Court listed the following criteria for deterrninina 
whether the proportionality of a sentence for Eighth Amendment 
purposes constitutes cruel and unusual punishment: ( 1} the 
gravity of the offense, (2) sentences imposed on other criminals 
in the same jurisdiction, and (3) sentences for the same crime in 
9 other jurisdictions. The sentence imposed upon the Appellant-
Amicone meets each of these elements. 
First, The gravity of unlawfully distributing obscene 
material of the crime is recognized by virtually all juris-
dictions and punished accordingly. In Hunt v. State, lO the 
Oklahoma Appellate Court addressed the issues of cruel and 
unusual punishment, and legislative purpose. The defendant was 
charged with the sale of obscene motion pictures, an offense 
similar to that of the Appellant-Amicone. In Hunt the defendant 
contended that the imposed sentence for distributing obscene 
material was excessive, cruel and unusual. 
The Court rejected the argument and held: 
"The appellant's seventh assignment of error is 
that the punishment imposed upon her was at the 
9~. at 649, 650. 
l0601 P.2d 464 (Okla. Cr., 1979). 
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Jeast excessive and could constitute cruel and 
unusual punishment. Title 21 O.S.1971, §1040.51, 
under which the appellant was charged, provides 
for a maximum punishment of 15 years' imprisonment 
and/or a fine of $25,000.00. She received a 
sentence of three years' imprisonment and a fine 
of $15,000.00. In her brief, the appellant 
asserts that Oklahoma is the only state in the 
United States providing for a possible sentence 
greater than seven years for an obscenity 
violation and that half the states have maximum 
punishments of one year or less. She also claims 
that 41 states impose a fine of $5,000.00 or less 
and 30 states impose a fine of $1,000.00 or 
less". While these data do indicate that 
Oklahoma's ohscenitv laws are severe, this is the 
sort of arqument one would make to the Legislature 
in seeking to have the law changed, rather than to 
this Court in seekinq to have a conviction under 
the law voided. Severe is not cruel. To 
constitute cruel and unusual punishment, a penalty 
must serve no valid leqislative purpose. Furman 
v. Georqia, 408 U.S. 238, 92 s.ct. 2726, 33 
L.Ed.2d 346 (1972), Justice Marshall concurring. 
We believe that the penalty provided by Section 
1040.51 indicates that Oklahoma Legislature's 
great concern to put a halt to obscenity traffic 
in Oklahoma. Clearly, this is a valid legislative 
purpose." Id. at 467. (Emphasis added). 
The Court reduced the sentence to one year and $5,000 on other 
grounds. 
The gravity with which Utah's Legislature views the 
distrihution of obscene material and the maximum penalty imposed 
for the offense, is similar to the majority of other state 
Jurisdictions, as referenced in Hunt, supra. The punishment of 
',1w 1, ,in offense has repeatedly been held to be a valid 
11 ll' lative matter. As noted above, the constitutionality of 
lll-:J arnma 's statute, which provides for up to 15 years 
1r~r1~0nment for selling obscene material, has been upheld 
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against a challenge alleging the sentence constitutec1 cruel anrl 
unusual punishment, Hunt, supra. 
Appellant continually attempts to discount the gravity of 
the admitted offense by referring to it as "minor", "not 
serious", and havinq no "specific victim". However the U.S. 
Supreme Court and the State legislature have determined 
otherwise. 11 The legislature has specifically provided that: 
"It is not a defense to prosecution .•• that the 
actor was-a motion picture projectionist, usher, 
ticket-taker, . or otherwise was required to 
violate any provision of this part incident to his 
employment." Section 76-10-1208 ( 2) (Emphasis 
added). 
Further, the Appellant admitted responsibility for the 
film's exhibition. Her actions specifically included receipt of 
funds from customers, and the knowledge of what the film 
contained. Those actions were an integral part of the now 
admitted unlawful distribution of obscene material. 
Owner's of businesses which exhibit explicit material do not 
make themselves easily available to answer for the showing of 
allegedly obscene material. The Legislature, well aware of this 
process, properly included all knowing participants in the 
distribution of obscene material and subjected them to a 
mandatory jail sentence when the offense is proven. 
Second, mandatory jail sentences are also required under 
Utah law for: inducing the acceptance of pornographic material, 
1 1 Paris , infra, Id . at 5 5-5 9 c i t ec1 p. 1 8 here i n. 
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"J0-1205(2); dealing in material harmful to minors, 76-10-
1106(3) and (4); and indecent public displays, 76-10-1228, all 
Utah Code Annotated., 1953 as amended. 
In addition, a review of sentences which have been imposed 
for er iminal offenses of this statute is set forth in part C, of 
the State's brief, infra at 16-17. 
Third, other jurisdictions impose similar or greater 
penalties to Utah's one year maximum sentence for the unlawful 
distribution of obscene material, Hunt, supra. Further, contrary 
to Appellant's assertion, Utah is not the only state which 
imposes a mandatory jail sentence for first time offenders. 
Tennessee provides for a mandatory 60 day incarceration without 
possibility of suspension for those convicted of distributing 
obscene material. A copy of Tennessee's statute is attached as 
Appendix "C". 
It is therefore submitted, that the mandatory seven day jail 
term under Utah law is not constitutionally disproportionate to 
the crime involved when measured against the Solem criteria, nor 
does it constitute cruel and unusual punishment. 
C. THE MANDATORY JAIL SE~TENCE PROVIDED FOR IN 
SECTION 76-10-1204(2) DOES NOT VIOLATE THE 
PROVISIONS OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT. 
The appellant contends that the mandatory jail sentence 
requirements of Utah law for the unlawful distribution of obscene 
material constitute a denial of due process and freedom of speech 
under the lltah anrl United States Constitutions. This contention 
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finds no support whatever in any leqislative enartrnPnt nor ifl th< 
authoritative pronouncement of any court. 
The Supreme Court of the United States has consistently helrl 
that obscene material has absolutely no protection under the 
law. In Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 12 the Supreme Court 
observed: 
"There are certain well-defined and narrowly 
limited classes of speech, the prevention and 
punishment of which have never been thought to 
raise any Constitutional problem. These include 
the lewd and obscene. . . It has been well 
observed that such utterances are no essential 
part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such 
sliqht social value as a step to truth that any 
benefit that may be derived from them is clearly 
outweighed by the social interest in order and 
morality. Id. at 571, 572. (Emphasis 
added). 
The Court held in Roth v. United States 13 : 
"We hold that obscenity is not within the area of 
constitutionally protected speech or press." Id. 
at 485. 
And in the landmark obscenity case, Miller v. California, 14 the 
court held: 
"This much has been categorically settled by the 
Court, that obscene material is unprotected by the 
First Amendment." Id. at 23. 
It is true that material, before it is found to be obscene, 
enjoys constitutional protection. However, that protection ends 
12 315 U.S. 568, 62 S. Ct. 766 (1942). 
13 354 U.S. 476, 77 S.Ct. 1304 (1957). 
14 413 U.S. 15, 93 S. Ct. 2607 (1973). 
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"a rletermination or an unqualified admission that the 
i11c1tf'r:-ial is obscene. There is no continuing protection beyond 
such determination to either the material or the exhibitor of the 
material, Miller, supra. 
In the present case, the appellant admitted that the 
material, a motion picture entitled "Ms. Magnificence", was 
oh•cene and that she was guilty of its exhibition. Appellant's 
plea of guilty totally removed any "dim and uncertain line" which 
may have existed as to the ohscenity of the material. 
Appellant suggests that whether material is obscene is 
completely a matter of "guessing" on behalf of those who deal in 
such material. If such were the case, the obscenity legislation 
suggested in Miller v. California, supra and enacted by the Utah 
Legislature in 76-10-1201, et seq. U.C.A. would have been held 
unconstitutionally vague. 
However, in State v. Haig, 15 this Court upheld the State's 
ohscenity against constitutional challenges of overbreadth and 
vagueness. This finding was reaffirmed in State v. Pierren, 16 
and in State v. Eagle Book. 17 
More recently, this Court addressed the issue of the 
ronstitutionality of the obscenity statute and the question of 
1 ', '> 7 fO p. 2d 837 (Utah, 19 7 8). 
16 583 P.2d 69 (Utah, 1978). 
1 7 :-, /"; -~ p. 2rl 73 (Utah, 19 7 p). 
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punishment under Section 76-10-1204(2). The Court held: 
"Our statute thus complies fully with the 
requirements set out by the high Court. It does 
not offend against any constitutional provision. 
It is a valid statute and those who so flagrantly 
flout it must pay the penalty for doing so." 
State v. Piepenburg, 602 P.2d 702, at 704 (Utah, 
1979) (Emphasis added). 
Had the court imposed a more severe sentence of one year in 
jail the appellant's free speech challenge and all other 
constitutional challenges would have evaporated. Yet, the far 
more lenient sentence, seven days and $1000, is so challenged 
simply because it coincides with the minimum sentence specified 
in the statute. Appellant's contention is without merit, as 
evidenced by the lack of any authoritative precedent to support 
the assertion. 
Argumentatively, appellant suggests to the Court that the 
mandatory jail sentence will result in the elimination of all 
protected material of a sexual nature, and that it also 
eliminates all judicial discretion in imposing sentences. This 
alarmist approach is totally unsupported and contradicted by 
fact. Many employees of the Studio Theatre have served mandatory 
jail sentences pursuant to the statute here under attack. Yet, 
there has been no indication that that establishment is inclined 
to show other than sexually oriented material. 
For example, James Piepenburg, the defendant in State v. 
-16-
,,,~i><:rihuro, 18 was the president and a director of the corporation 
,,111ch operated the Studio Theatre. Piepenburg was charged and 
.. onv icted under the same section of the state law at issue here, 
and he was sentenced to six months in jail with three months 
suspended. 
Randy Taylor, former manager of the Studio Theatre, was also 
convicted and sentenced under this same statute and ultimately 
served 90 days in jail. 19 other managers of this theatre have 
served jail sentences of 15 days and many other employees, like 
the appellant, have served the minimum mandatory jail term 
required by the statute. 20 
The foregoing demonstrates the fallacy of appellant's 
"chilling effect" argument. It also demonstrates that sentencing 
Courts use discretion in imposing sentences, which reflect 
various mitigating factors and responsibility for the particular 
offense involved. 
The reasons for the existence and firm enforcement of 
obscenity legislation were pointed out in the landmark case of 
Paris Adult T~eatre v. Slaton. 21 The Supreme Court, after 
18602 P.2d 702, 705 (Utah, 1979). 
19state of Utah v. Randy Taylor, 78 CRS 341. 
'°-state of lJtah v . .Joyce Vigil, 79 CRS 983; State of Utah v. 
J0mes A. King, 81 CHS 351; State of Utah v. Gary Lee Hill and 
Marilyn Oldrnvd, CR 78-648. 
ll413 U.S. 49 (1973). 
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rejecting the argument that showinq pornoaraphic films to 
"consenting adults" is immune from state regulation, made these 
incisive comments: 
"In particular, we hold that there are legitimate 
state interests at stake in stemming the tide of 
commercialized obscenity, . These include the 
interest of the public in the equality of life and 
the total community environment, the tone of 
commerce in the great city centers, and, possibly 
the public safety itself. . however, there 
remains one problem of large propcrtions aptly 
described by Professor Bickel: 
"'It concerns the tone of the society, the mode, 
or to use terms that have perhaps greater 
currency, the style and quality of life, now and 
in the future. Even supposing that each of 
us can, if he wishes, effectively avert the eye 
and stop the ear (which, in truth, we cannot), 
what is commonly read and seen and heard and done 
intrudes upon us all, want it or not.' 22 The 
Public Interest 25-26 (Winter 1971). 
"As Mr. Chief Justice Warren stated, there is a 
'right of the Nation and of the States to maintain 
a decent society . Id. at 58-59. 
(Emphasis added). 
The State submits that the right to punish the distribution 
of obscene material extends to the right of the legislature to 
impose a mandatory penalty for such crime. Such a penalty does 
not violate the First Amendment. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant-Amicone's conviction for a class A misdemeanor wa 
potentially punishable by a fine of $1000 and one year in 
jail. 22 Yet the Appellant was merely given seven days in iail 
22 76-3-204 and 76-3-301 Utah CodP Ann., 1953. 
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,,,J,.rPrl t" pciv a $1000 fine. Such a sentence can hardly be 
• 1 .1 tn he excessive or disproportionate. 
The leqislature of the State of Utah has very clearly 
1 nrlicated the gravity with which it views the crime of 
d1str ihlltinq pnrno9raphy. In addition to the mandatory minimum 
prnalty for a first time conviction, the legislature has made 
c11!->S>cJUent obscenity Offenses felonies, without possibility Of 
suspcri.=;inn nf sentence. Mandatory sentences, without suspension 
ha'.'e ,11.;o been mandated for other fJtah crimes. Similar penalties 
ha~e alsn been imposed by other jurisdictions. 
The mandatory sentencing provision of 76-10-1204(2} Utah 
~dP Af1_12,., lg53 is fully constitutional and reflects the judgment 
nf thP legislature. It is respectfully submitted that the 
constitutionality of the statute should be upheld and the 
sentence of the Apoellant he affirmed. 
DATED this day of September, 1983. 
ROGER F. CUTLER 
Salt Lake City Attorney 
PAUL G. MAUGHAN 
Assistant City Attorney 
STANLEY H. OLSEN 
Assistant Citv Prosecutor 
Attorneys for-Plaintiff-Respondent 
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l.PPE!~DIX "A" 
RECEIVEO 
CITY ATTORNEY'S OFF:CE 
DA1E .y)!?JS:3. 
I 11 L .\TTOE~EY GENERAL 
~TAl'E OF T JT All 
Roger F. Cutler 
Salt Lake City Attorney 
100 City and County Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
September 8, 1983 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
PAUL M. TINKER 
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL 
FRAXKLYK B MATHESQS, GH!El' 
Governmentel Affeo~ Oov•soon 
ROBERT R WALL.ACE, Gmr.:P' 
L1t1getion 01111s1on 
'ft1WAM: T. EVANS. Caru· 
Humen Re!!.ource"' Q,v1s1on 
DOS.UD S GOLEMA...". CHIE.l' 
Pi'iys•cel Re'!>ource~ Q,,,,9,cn 
~1;.p~J~n;?~~'.,';o1~~~6~~1,~ 
Re: State of Utah v. Heather s. Amicone 
Supreme Court No. 19183 
Dear Roger: 
As you may be aware, the defendant in the referenced 
matter has appealed to the Utah Supreme Court on the basis of 
the alleged unconstitutionality of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1204 
( 19 53) . 
It is my understanding that your off ice 
the State in Circuit and District Courts pursuant 
authority of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1215 (1953). 
pleaded guilty in Circuit Court and subsequently 
mandatory jail sentence imposed by that court. 
represented 
to the 
The defendant 
appealed a 
The Third District Court by Judge Wilkinson found 
the statute constitutional and this appeal followed. 
I would be grateful if your office would continue to 
assist us in the handling of this matter at the Supreme Court 
including preparation of the brief and the presentation of oral 
arguments. 
cc: Geoffrey Butler 
Sincerely, 
~ 
"-t:}~ 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
I ! { \ l) 1 JI) I ! I l \h! < I"IY. I T\H Hllll TELEPHOl"E 801-533-5261 
APPENDIX 'B " 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LA.KE COutlTY, STATE OF UTAH 
51'\TF: OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
\' s DECISIOll 
: . ··"· S. ?J<I COI<E, CRHlINAL NO. CRA 82-52 
Defend2nt/Appcll~nt . 
..... :.'o'·,,·cn::itled r".2tte:- co::-es before the Court on appeal 
._\.. - .. : ~ ' - t : h d 2 ,. 0 f J '-' 1 :: ' 
Subse~uent thereto on the 30th day 
l L ·-1~ ~, igp,:_:, thL! Court ~,e::ntenced th2 defendant to pay a fine of 
0
] JiWJ.00 ,,·it~c one vear in jail, all but seven days of jail sentence 
t\ [.2 suc:pcnded. Defendant's appeal is based on (1) the mandatory 
•~ntencc requirement of the Utah Code Section 76-10-1201, et seq are 
unconstitutional incursions on judicial authority; (2) the mandatory 
scn:cnce provision of the Utah Code Section 76-10-1201, et seq vio-
late Article I, Section 24 of the Utah Constitution. Both parties 
ha~~ submitted a brief covering the questions of law, the Court having 
· :l the s:1me and nov 11eing fully advised in the premises renders its 
1un. 
\ ' ~ ;" 11I.I1·;: PACE TWO DECISION 
('"ql't finds thal Section 76-10-1204(2), Utah Code 
;1, d, 195] as amended, is constitutional and is a valid 
1 s]dtive enactment, that it is not an intrusion into the 
.~icidl function by the Legislature, nor is it a violation 
,r thl· separation of powers doctrine. See Cc2mom .. ·ealth vs. 
1 dson, 344 N.E.2d 166, Mass. 1976; State vs. Motlev, 
S ~-~d 435, Mo. App. 1976, and McOuoid vs. S~ith, 
·;0 . "d 595, 1st Cir. 1977. The Court further finds the 
---,Jatn:\' j2il sentence as imposed by Section 76-10-1204(2) 
; (1f 2 d1~Tiic~ 0: Cue process c3nd freedoD of sreech UTtder 
See 1-'.iller vs. 
l ', q3 s Ct ~ ( (J 7 ( l q 73) ; cr:~r-li~s~:y 
.,- .. 
' 
l j l' ' 5 t- c: ( 
., c (~ . ~ l ~'\ (} : ) ; -:::-,__i 
- · " \',. l' ;ii c: £.CL 5_ l_9_t_ ''-2 . 3 5 L. L1 S . 4 76 , 77 S . Ct . 1 3 0 4 ( 1 9 5 7) . 
_,J~L'(~ e._';1 t11c fc)rC't~.0in~', the Court finc~s in fn\ 1 0r 0[ the plaintiff 
"nrl a;·ciinst the defendant, and sustains the ;.entcncin~- of the 
Cncuit Court, .:md remands the rBttcr l.Jacl-. to the Circuit Court 
ror imposition of the sentence. 
:.Jat<?d this /(J~ day of March, 1983. 
/fi.~of.~ 
APPENDIX "C" 
" (a) It sh al 1 be unlawful to knowingly send or 
cause to be sent, or bring or cause to be brought, 
into this state for sale, distribution, exhibi-
tion, or display, or in this state to prepare for 
distribution, publish, print, exhibit, distribute, 
or offer to distribute, or to possess with intent 
to distribute or to exhibit or offer to distribute 
any obscene matter. It shall be unlawful to 
direct, present, or produce any obscene theatrical 
production, peep shows or live performance and 
every person who participates in that part of such 
production which renders said production or 
performance obscene is guilty of said offense. 
"(b) Notwithstanding any of the provisions of 
§§39-6-1001 - 39-6-1115, the distribution of 
obscene matter to minors shall be governed by §39-
6-1131 et seq. In case of any conflict between 
tho provisions of §§39-6-1101 - 39-6-1115 and §39-
6-1131 et seq., the provisions of the latter shall 
prevail as to minors. 
"(c) It shall be unlawful to hire, employ, or use 
a minor to do or assist in doing any of the acts 
described in subsection (a) with knowledge that a 
person is a minor under eighteen (18) years of 
age, or while in possession of such facts that he 
or she should reasonably know that such person is 
a minor under eighteen (18) years of age. 
"(d)(l) Any person who violates the provisions of 
this section shall, upon conviction of the first 
such offense, be guilty of a misdemeanor and be 
punished by imprisonment in the county jail or 
workhouse for a period of sixty (60) days. 
"(2) Any person who violates the provisions of 
this section and who has been convicted of one (1) 
prior violation of this section shall, upon 
conviction of the second such offense, be guilty 
of a mi~rlcrneanor and be punished by imprisonment 
in the· C•'crnty jail or workhouse for a period of 
eleven ()Ji months and twenty-nine (29) days. 
" ( 3) '"". peer son who violates the provisions of 
this 5'·ct1nn anrl who has been convicted of at 
leilc·c•. t·"''" ( 2) prior violations of this section 
shc~1~ 1 ur)-,'.'" c_·r_H1\1 iction of the thirc1 nr- subsequent 
rr74 
0ffen~e. be guilty of a felony and be punished by 
imprisonment in the penitentiary for a definite 
term of not less than two (2) years nor rrore than 
five (5) years. 
"(e)(l) For purposes of this subsection, a Class 
A violator shall be any person sentenced under the 
provisions of subsection (d) who distributes 
obscene books, magazines, newspapers, pictures, 
drawings, photographs or other printed or written 
material when such obscene material represents 
twenty-five percent (25%) or less of the stock-in-
trade, and inventory, and sales of such violator 
during any given twenty-four (24) hour period. A 
Class B violator shall be any other person 
sentenced under the provisions of subsection (d) 
who is not defined as a Class A violator. Upon 
application for sentencing as a Class A violator, 
as defined above, such violator shall have the 
burden of proving his classification. 
"(2) The sentences imposed in subsection (d) of 
this section shall be mandatory for a Class B 
violator, and no Class B violator sentenced under 
the provisions of such subsection shall be 
eligible for suspension of sentence and probation, 
release on parole, or any other program whereby 
such person enjoys the privilege of supervised or 
unsupervised release into the community or whereby 
such person is released, permanently or 
temporarily, prior to the expiration of his 
sentence, including, but not limited to, 
participation in any programs authorized by §§41-
21-208 or 41-21-227. Provided, further, no Class 
B violator sentenced under subsection (d) of this 
section shall receive good, honor or incentive 
time credit towaros the expiration of such 
sentence as authorized by §§41-21-212, 41-21-214 
or 41-21-228; nor shall such sentence expire in 
any other manner until it has been entirely served 
day for day. 
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